It is difficult to believe that Narendra Modi’s government was not aware of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed’s plan to release Masarat Alam.
In a state where nothing moves without the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB) knowledge, arguing that Alam’s release came as a surprise to Modi and Ajit Doval would be tantamount to calling the Indian intelligence a huge failure in the Valley.
Also, Mufti’s penchant for mushy decisions on jailed terrorists is well known. In 1989, as the Union Home Minister, he had prevailed upon the VP Singh government to release five JKLF terrorists to secure the release of his kidnapped daughter Rubaiya Sayeed.
And in 2002, before he returned as the state’s chief minister in alliance with the Congress, Sayeed aggressively advocated the policy of making sentimental gestures to separatists by releasing terrorists languishing in jails.
“The sentimentality of Sayeed's perspectives on terrorism is not new, and this is a position that is common virtually across the board in populist Indian politics. It has, moreover, been repeatedly translated into a state policy of vacillation and drift in various theatres of terrorism and mass political violence with consistently disastrous results,” KPS Gill, former Punjab DGP, wrote soon after Mufti became the CM in 2002. He argued that Mufti’s elevation at the present stage of the conflict in J&K “bodes ill for the counter-terrorism effort in the state.”
Mufti’s plan is clear, his politics is simple: ‘win the hearts’ of people in the Valley, even if it undermines the counter-terrorism efforts of the security agencies. He will not change his policy of appeasing hardliners in spite of the noises emanating from within the BJP. In fact, as reports indicate, he is likely to release a few more hardliners and terrorists languishing in jails.
Jammu and Kashmir CM Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. AFP
So, when the Modi government wrings its hands in helplessness over Masarat’s release, it should be seen either as its politically naiveté and administrative incompetence (less likely) and more as political doublespeak on Mufti’s politics of sentimental gestures. Publicly, the BJP wants to disagree with his decisions, but internally it may be willing to allow the CM a degree of freedom to pursue his policy of appeasement and see how the situation evolves in the Valley with his overtures.
In the end, if the Valley remains under Mufti’s control, whose survival in turn depends on the BJP, New Delhi becomes the ultimate beneficiary. Also, the BJP knows that to fulfil its promise of development, it would first have to ensure peace in the Valley. So, Mufti would be allowed to take decisions that keep potential troublemakers in the Valley silent.
In his stinging critique of Sayeed, Gill had argued that the ‘healing hearts’ policy ends up harming India’s interests by emboldening terrorists and showcasing the state as soft. He pointed out that Sayeed’s tenure as home minister in the VP Singh government led to revival of militancy in the Valley and increase in terrorist strikes in Punjab. Sayeed’s approach is flawed since “there has been no evolution of a counter-terrorism perspective, or any understanding of the nature of the Pakistan backed movements in J&K among the leadership of this political formation,” Gill wrote.
So, obviously, there is no guarantee that Sayeed would succeed this time. His approach may, in fact, complicate problems in the Valley, just like in the past. If this happens, the BJP would be the biggest loser.
By supporting the PDP, giving up its stand on Article-370 and acquiescing to release of political prisoners like Alam, the BJP has already made its supporters in Jammu angry. If Sayeed’s politics and policies create trouble in the Valley and increase the Jammu-Kashmir divide, the BJP would pay a heavy political price south of Banihal pass.
The wily Mufti, however, has very little to lose. With his pro-separatist decisions, he has started consolidating support in the Valley. By positioning himself as the champion of Kashmiri rights and Kashmiriyat, he is trying to edge the National Conference and the Congress out of the Valley.
Tomorrow, if Amit Shah and Modi decide to withdraw support to the government and fresh elections are held, who would benefit from the consolidation of Kashmiri votes and the BJP’s decline in Delhi?
The future of Kashmir’s politics is hidden in the answers to these questions.
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